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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici curiae are the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and 
Equality, the Asian Bar Association of Washington, the Pacific Nmihwest 
District of the Japanese American Citizens League, and the Vietnamese 
Bar Association of Washington. Amici are dedicated to advancing the fair 
administration of justice and removing barriers to minority pmiicipation in 
the court system. Detailed statements of interest are attached to this brief 
as Appendix A. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Because Admitting Profiling Evidence that Discriminates on the Basis 
of National Origin Violates Due Process, Constitutional Harmless 
Error Should Apply. 
A. Admitting Profiling Evidence that Discriminates on the Basis of 
National Origin Violates State and Federal Constitutional Rights. 
The trial couti violated Brajesh's due process rights by admitting 
profiling evidence that impermissibly based a propensity for abduction on 
his national origin. Injecting a litigant's race or national origin into a trial 
proceeding violates his due process rights because it calls for speculation 
based on his national origin rather than an evaluation based on his actions. 
In United States v. Cabrera, the govemment's lead witness testified 
at length during a Cuban defendant's jury trial, making numerous 
stereotypes about how Cubans package dmgs and evade law enforcement. 
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222 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that 
"[a ]peals to racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice" impermissibly violate an 
individual's due process rights and that the officer's testin10ny "had the 
cumulative effect of putting the ... Cuban community on trial, rather than 
sticking to the facts ofCabrera['s] ... drug offense[]."). Id. at 594, 596. 
Similarly, in Bains v. Cambra, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a 
prosecutor ened by appealing to racial and ethnic stereotypes about an 
Indian defendant. 204 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically, the 
prosecutor in this murder case made repeated claims that members of the 
Sikh religion become violent iffemale family members are wronged. The 
comi concluded that those references "invited the jury to give in to their 
prejudices and to buy into the various stereotypes that the prosecutor was 
promoting." Id. at 974. "[U]nder clearly established federal law" this 
conduct violated the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. I d. 
Like the evidence in Cabrera and Bains, the expe1i witness's 
testimony, in the words of the Comi of Appeals, "was essentially akin to 
profile evidence, inadmissible in criminal proceedings." Slip. Op. at 21. 
The comi went on to state that this type of evidence "identifies a group of 
people as more likely to commit a crime, and is inadmissible if it is used to 
lead to the conclusion that a defendant must have corrunitted the charged 
crime because he shared the characteristics of known offenders." I d. at 21-
2 
22. Like the testimony in Cabrera and Bains, the expert's so-called "red-
flags," were actually ethnic stereotypes based on Brajesh's cultural ties to 
India that were used to make it appear more likely that he would abduct 
his own children. Id. at 22. 
Injecting race and national origin into a trial also violates a 
litigant's state due process rights. In State v. Monday, this Court held that 
a prosecutor's appeals to racial prejudice constituted reversible error. 171 
Wn.2d 667, 257 P.3d 551 (2011). During the trial, the prosecutor 
undermined the credibility of Black witnesses by claiming that "black folk 
don't testify against black folk." Id. at 674. The Comt of Appeals 
acknowledged that the prosecutor "made a blatant appeal to racial 
prejudice," but nevetiheless affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the 
enor was "hannless." Id. at 675. This Comt reversed, concluding that the 
racially-charged misconduct "fatally tainted" the proceedings, thereby 
depriving the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 669. "[T]heories and 
arguments based upon racial, ethnic and most other stereotypes are 
antithetical to and impermissible in a fair and impmtial trial." !d. at 678 
(internal citations omitted). 
Like the racially charged statements in Monday, this evidence was 
based on racial, ethnic, and national origin stereotypes, and violated 
Brajesh's due process rights. 
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B. These Constitutional Rights Apply with Equal Force in a Civil 
Proceeding. 
The harms associated with discriminatory racial profiling are not 
limited to the criminal sphere. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 
Inc., a black construction worker sued a concrete company for negligence. 
500 U.S. 614, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 114 L. E. 2d 660 (1991). During voir dire, 
the company used its peremptory challenges to strike black jurors. On 
appeal, the U.S. Supreme Comi made clear that "[r]acial discrimination 
has no place in the courtroom, whether the proceeding is civil or 
criminal." Id. at 630. Indeed, a "civil proceeding often implicates 
significant rights and interests." Id. Civil adjudications, "no less than those 
of their criminal counterpmis, become binding judgments of the co mi." I d. 
Congress, the Court explained, has "prohibit[ ed] various discrin1inat01y 
acts in the context of both civil and criminal trials .... The Constitution 
demands nothing less." Id. (citing, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 243 (prohibiting 
exclusion of jurors on account of race or color in civil and criminal 
proceedings)). "If our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial 
democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race 
stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury." Id. 
at 630-31. Therefore, eve1y litigant, civil and criminal, has the right to 
have his issues "explored in a rational way that consists with respect for 
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the dignity of persons, without the use of classifications based on ancestry 
or skin color." Id. at 631. 
Tllis Court has made clear that it will not tolerate racial or national 
origin discrimination in a criminal proceeding. Monday, 171 Wn.2d at 
678. There is no reason it should tolerate the same discrimination simply 
because it occurs in the civil context. The Comt should use this 
oppmtunity to state clearly and unequivocally that race and national origin 
discrimination has no place in the civil context either. 
C. The Court of Appeals Failed to Apply the Correct Standard of 
Review and Incorrectly Concluded that this Error Was Harmless. 
1. The Court of Appeals Misapplied Harmless Error Review. 
Constitutional hmmless enor review applies to constitutional 
errors in the trial process. State v. Brown, 147 Wn.2d 330,341, 58 P.3d 
889 (2002). "In order to hold the error harmless, [tllis Comt] must 
'conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the [trial comt's decision] would 
have been the same absent the enor. "' I d. (quoting Neder v. United States, 
527 U.S. 1, 19, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999)). 
Accordingly, there are two rules embedded within the harmless 
enor standard of review. First, there exists a rebuttable presumption that a 
constitutional error was harmful. Second, the beneficimy of that error- in 
this case, Lynette- carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
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doubt that the enor had no effect on the outcome. Put differently, this 
constitutional error is presumed harmful to Brajesh unless Lynette shows 
beyond a reasonable doubt that it was harmless. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 9; 
State v. Watt, 160 Wn.2d 626, 635, 160 P.3d 640 (2007) (constitutional 
errors are "presumed to be prejudicial" and placing the burden on the 
beneficiary to demonstrate harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt). 
It is not clear what standard of review the Court of Appeals 
applied. It appears that rather than applying constitutional harmless error, 
the Court of Appeals applied a lower, non-constitutional enor standard. 
While the Court of Appeals explained that "the trial court ... did not 
adopt [the expert's] risk factor analysis," Slip Op. at 22, the focus should 
not have been on whether the trial court explicitly adopted the improper 
profiles. Instead, the admission of the profiles should have been found to 
be presumptively prejudicial, and the proper question should have been 
whether Lynette demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the enor 
did not affect the outcome. 
Moreover, to the extent the Comi of Appeals applied a non-
constitutional harmless error review, it committed two enors oflaw. First, 
the Comi of Appeals effectively presumed that the enor was harmless, 
rather than adopting a rebuttable presumption that the enor was hannful. 
In fact, nowhere in its relatively terse treatment of this enor does the Court 
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of Appeals ever mention that it is presuming the error was hmmful. See 
Slip Op. at 22 (stating that "it appears" that the trial comt "largely 
disregarded" the profiling evidence). Second, by focusing on other facts 
that conceivably could have justified the trial court's decision, the Comt of 
Appeals enoneously placed the burden of proof on Brajesh to demonstrate 
that the error was hannful, rather than placing the burden on Lynette to 
prove that it was hmmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Slip Op. at 22-
23 (accepting the trial court's statement that Brajesh's "testimony and 
conduct alone" justified the travel restrictions). 
Because the Court of Appeals failed to apply the conect standard 
of review, it is impossible to tell from its opinion how the trial comt 
weighed the profiling evidence or where the evidence entered the trial 
comt's calculus. In hindsight, the Comi of Appeals pointed to other 
evidence that could have justified the decision, and ended its inquiry there. 
But that is not harmless enor review. Harmless error review does not ask 
whether there is sufficient evidence, absent the enor, to support the 
verdict; hatmless enor review asks whether it is clem·, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the error had no effect on the outcome. 1 
1 For instance, in the criminal context, this Court applies the "overwhelming untainted 
evidence" test to determine whether a constitutional error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Watt, 160 Wn.2d at 635-36. If this test were applied here, in 
the civil context, the appellate court would "look[] only to the untainted evidence to 
detennine if the untainted evidence is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a 
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For the reasons stated below, this Court should apply the conect 
standard and hold that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
2. This Error Was Not Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Under the constitutional harmless enor standard, tllis Court "will 
vacate a [disposition] unless it necessarily appears, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the misconduct did not affect the verdict." Monday, 171 Wn.2d 
at 680. During the hearing the expeti not only testified as to risk profiles 
implicating Br~esh's national origin, he also described India as a 
primitive, dangerous, and lawless country, in order to buttress the claim 
that the consequences of an abduction would be severe. IX RP, p. 49. The 
expeti even testified that if the children were taken to India, they may be 
attacked or harmed by other Indians if they were to accidentally hlt a cow 
-an unveiled reference to Hindus and Muslims. Id. at p. 12. In fact, the 
only positive comment the expert had to say about India was also an 
ethnic stereotype: he testified that it is "cmmnon knowledge that India is a 
bastion of opportunity" for men like Brajesh who work in computer 
finding" that Brajesh will abduct his children. !d.: see also State v. Koslowski, 166 
Wn.2d 409, 431, 209 P.3d 479 (2009). But the Com1 of Appeals did not apply this test. 
Here, the evidence was not so ovenvhelming) as indicated by the trial judge's wavering 
stance on whether she believed Brajesh would keep the children in India. See VI RP I 0; 
App. B-3 ("I'm not persuaded, based on all the evidence presented, including that of the 
expert witnesses who were called to testifY, that !VIr. Katare presents a serious threat of 
abducting the children."). 
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science. Id. at 31. "Thev excel at that." Id. (emphasis added). And finally, 
the expert miiculated various "red flags" that increased the likelihood that 
Brajesh would abduct his children, such as his Indian lifestyle and his 
interactions with other Indian Americans in Washington State. Id. at pp. 
48-49. Because these blatant, explicit, and nakedly discriminatory 
stereotypes were used to show that Brajesh was more likely to abduct his 
children, this enor was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 
Indeed, the Comi of Appeals' conclusion that this error had no 
effect on the subsequent decision is devoid of any analysis or application 
of the harmless enor review standm·d. It is also inconsistent with the trial 
court's original decision to admit it. By denying Brajesh's motion to keep 
this evidence out, the trial comi expressed a clem· desire to hear the 
expert's profiling evidence. In this way, "the injury caused by the 
discrin1ination is made more severe because the government permits it to 
occur within the courthouse itself." Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628. "Race 
discrimination within the courtroom raises serious questions as to the 
fairness of the proceedings conducted there. Racial bias mars the integrity 
of the judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic government 
from becoming a reality." Id. To admit discriminatory profiling evidence 
"in this official forum compounds the racial insult inherent in judging a 
2 For more examples of this expert's discriminatory testimony) see Brief of Amici Curiae 
in the Court of Appeals, at 12-14. 
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citizen by the color of his or her skin." I d. 
While the Court of Appeals did acknowledge that the evidence was 
discriminatory, Amici assert that the evidence "crossed that line." 
Monday, 171 Wn.2d at 677. Tllis evidence, once introduced, poisoned the 
framework of the proceedings. "[I]ntentional appeals to racial prejudices 
cannot be minimized or easily rationalized as harmless." Monday. 171 
Wn.2d at 680.3 The Court of Appeals' harmless error analysis did not 
attempt to quantify its impact. 4 
Contrary to Lynette's claims, Amici are not asking that the Court 
allow Brajesh to hide "bellind the shield of discrimination."5 Rather, all 
we ask is for the Comi to denounce the sword of discrimination that was 
3 This Court also should consider the calculus confronting Brajesh and all other 
immigrant parents in his position. A parent with strong ties to his culture may choose not 
to defend his right to travel with his children to his homeland because he knows that he 
fits the "profile" of a likely "abductor"- thereby stopping the proceedings before they 
start. Alternatively, a parent may choose to avoid these culturally-based "red flags" 
altogether by minimizing the ethnic and cultural ties he has to his home country. In this 
way, profiling evidence presents naturalized parents like Brajesh with a Hobson's Choice 
between abandoning their culture to avoid the red flags, or embracing their culture but 
not initiating proceedings to avoid the evidence that will likely be introduced against 
them. Hannless error analysis cannot easily quantifY this cascading effect. 
"For instance, an expert who is allowed to present race-based profiling evidence 
functionally shifts the burden onto the immigrant parent, like Brajesh, to prove that he 
would not abduct his own children, that he is not a future criminal, that he can be trusted 
to be a father- or should be trusted. The sleight of hand is subtle, but significant: 
Brajesh, based solely on his national origin, loses the benefit of the doubt that a non-
immigrant parent with a similarly clean criminal record would never lose. "Perhaps more 
effective but just as insidious are subtle references. Like wolves in sheep's clothing, a 
carelhl word here and there can trigger racial bias." Monday. 171 Wash.2d at 678. Or, in 
this case, national origin bias. 
5 See Respondent's Answer to Amici's Brief in the Court of Appeals, at 3. 
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used to cut off an immigrant parent's children from half their culture. 
Amici know all too well about our country and state's unfortunate history 
when it comes to discrimination on the basis of race and national origin. 6 
Discrimination on the basis of national origin is of serious concem 
to Amici. Errors like this are rarely harmless, whether they occur in a 
criminal or civil proceeding, because "[i]f justice is not equal for all, it is 
not justice." Monday, 171 Wn.2d at 680. Appellate comis have a special 
duty to closely scrutinize these types of errors to ensure that they are not 
used as litigation tactics. But rather than rigorously applying constitutional 
hannless etTor analysis, the Court of Appeals' faux-review effectively 
rubberstamps the admission of profiling evidence, thereby increasing the 
probability that it will occur again. 
Amici urge tllis Comi to make clear that profiling individuals 
based on their national origin has no place in parenting plan adjudications. 
The Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed. 
3. Reversal Would Be Consistent with this Court's Decision in 
Monday 
6 11\Vashington1s early history included severe anti-immigrant sentiment expressed first 
toward Chinese immigrants and then Japanese immigrants, who were the target of the 
state's Alien Land Laws .... Washington State was hardly immune to racial bias. For 
instance, in March 1942, 14,400 persons of Japanese descent lived in Washington State, 
including 9,600 in King County alone. Of these, nearly 13,000 were incarcerated and 
placed into internment camps. Over 30% of those forcibly removed from Seattle never 
retumed to their homes." The Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System, 
Preliminmy Report on Race and Washington's Criminal Justice System, *5 (2011). 
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In State v. Monday the majority wrote, 
Defendants are among the people the 
prosecutor represents. The prosecutor owes 
a duty to defendants to see that their rights 
to a constitutionally fair trial are not 
violated .... A prosecutor gravely violates a 
defendant's [constitutional rights] when the 
prosecutor resorts to racist argument and 
appeals to racist stereotypes or racial bias to 
achieve convictions. 
171 Wn.2d at 676 (intemal citations omitted). This analysis applies as 
much, if not more, to judges. Here, the trial comi owed a duty to Brajesh 
to see that his rights to a constitutionally fair process were not violated. 
The comi "gravely violate[ d]" this duty when it allowed appeals to racial 
stereotypes and national origin bias to be used by one party against 
another to achieve a certain result. Similar to the appeals to racial 
stereotypes in Monday, the stereotypes here were subtle, but "insidious." 
Id. at 678. 
Additionally, reversal would be consistent with Chief Justice 
Madsen's three-judge concurrence. Writing separately, Chief Justice 
Madsen stated that "the injection of insidious discrimination into this case 
is so repugnant to the core principles of integrity and justness upon which 
a fundamentally fair ... justice system must rest that only a new trial will 
remove its taint." Id. at 680 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). The concmTence 
cautioned that errors like this are not easily amenable to harmless error 
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analysis because there will often be an abundance of non-discriminatory 
evidence to justify the result. "Rather than engage in an unconvincing 
attempt to show the error here was not harmless," the concurrence 
advocated for a categorical rule against injecting racial discrimination into 
adjudicative proceedings. Id. at 682. The concurrence concluded that 
injecting racial discrimination into the comiroom is '"antithetical to the 
purposes of the fourteenth amendment ... whether in a procedure 
underlying, the atmosphere smmunding, or the actual conduct of, a trial." 
!d. (quoting United States ex rei. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 
159 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
Ultimately, eight justices in Monday agreed that injecting racial 
animus into a trial constituted reversible error. Amici urge tllis Comito 
apply its analysis from Monday to this case to conclude that appeals to 
racial stereotypes during parental custody proceedings violate the core 
principles of fairness underlying the adjudicative process. 
II. Rulings on Foreign Law Are Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, and 
the Court of Appeals Committed Reversible Error When It Treated 
International Law as an Issue of Fact Alone. 
Questions regarding international law are issues of law that are 
reviewed de novo. The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that the 
trial court's foreign law conclusions are factual issues that merit deference 
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on review. By treating foreign law conclusions as factual issues, the Court 
of Appeals misapplied Washington law. 
While foreign law is an issue of fact at the pleading stage, it 
becomes an issue of law on appeal. Foreign law must be pleaded as if it 
were a fact by the party relying on it. State v. Rivera, 95 Wn. App. 961, 
966, 977 P .2d 124 7 (1999). This pleading requirement places the 
responsibility of presenting the appropriate evidence on the pmty 
proposing the foreign law conclusion. Id. The pleading stage mimics 
factual pleadings. But although the pleading stage resembles factual 
pleadings, foreign law 
is not a tme "fact" except in the procedural 
manner of its proof. Though foreign law is 
denominated as "fact" a11d is to be proven as 
such, the ultimate context and substance of 
the proposed foreign law is decided as an 
issue of law. The gist thereof should be set 
forth as a conclusion of the trial comi, and 
the conclusion is reviewable. 
Byme v. Cooper, II Wn. App. 549,553,523 P.2d 1216 (1974) (citing 
State v. Jackovick, 56 Wn.2d 915, 355 P.2d 976 (1960)). 
Thus, whatever conclusion the trial court makes as to foreign law 
should be treated as a conclusion of law- reviewable de novo. This mixed 
treatment is pragmatic. On the one hand, foreign law is a fachml question 
to the extent that the patty claiming it must present the research and 
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evidence to suppott the pleading. Id. at 555. On the other hand, once the 
evidence has been presented "it is not in its essential nature a fact any 
more than domestic law is a fact." I d. (internal citation omitted). A trial 
judge's foreign law conclusions are treated as if they were domestic law 
conclusions- that is, in the event of a jury trial, the judge would consider 
the evidence in the jury's absence and "instruct the jury on the foreign law 
in the same mmmer that he would instruct on local law." I d. 
Here, the trial comt misread Exhibit 25 to conclude that 
"proceedings in India do not include sunm1ary proceedings." CP 156. In 
fact, India's constitution allows for a writ of habeas corpus to issue to 
return an abducted child to his country of residence. Ex. 25, p. 111. 
Additionally, Exhibit 25 misstates the holding in Dhanwanti Joshi v. 
Madhav Unde (1998) 1 SCC 112, which explains that summary 
proceedings are available. Because the Comt of Appeals defened to the 
trial court's erroneous conclusion that Indian law does not include 
summary proceedings for abducted children, its holding is completely at 
odds with how Indian law operates. Unless this Court corrects this error, 
other parents of Indian descent will suffer from similar difficulties because 
the non-Indian parent would be able to point to the Court of Appeals' 
decision explicitly denying that summary proceedings exist in India. 
Amici's Memorandum in Suppott of Petition for Review further outlines 
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the trial court's inaccurate characterizations of Indian law. 
The Court of Appeals ened by failing to realize that the trial 
court's erroneous conclusion regarding Indian law was subject to de novo 
review like any other legal finding. This Court should make clear that a 
trial court's foreign law conclusions are subject to the same standard of 
review that applies to state law conclusions. 
III. The Lower Courts' Decisions Place Too Much Emphasis on Whether 
a Country Is a Hague Signatory, Rather than Whether a Country's 
Internal Procedures Provide Adequate Protection. 
The trial coutt relied too heavily on the fact that India is not a 
Hague signatory. Placing undue reliance on whether a country is a Hague 
signatory allows for national origin to affect family law decisions in an 
arbitrary manner. This issue is a serious concern, especially for Amici, 
because most countries that have not signed the Hague Convention are in 
Asia and the Middle East. Although Amici brought this issue to the Coutt 
of Appeals, it never addressed it- other than noting that Amici brought it 
up. Slip Op. at 17. 
By using India's non-Hague status as a reason to impose the travel 
restrictions, the trial court effectively adopted a bright-line rule that 
parents from non-Hague countries face a higher burden of proof to 
demonstrate that they will not abduct their own children. This mle 
unnecessarily penalizes a law-abiding parent and "border[ s] on 
16 
xenophobia, a long word with a long and sinister past." Abouzahr v. 
Matera-Abouzahr, 361 N.J. Super. 135, 156,824 A.2d 268 ( 2003). This 
bright-line rule focuses the comt's attention away from a particular 
country's intemal procedures regarding child abductions. 7 
Additionally, the court's undue reliance on India's non-Hague 
status allows a comt to use the mere possibility of a worst -case scenario 
against a parent, without considering how low that probability truly is 
given the parent's ties to the United States. See Long v. Ardestani, 241 
Wis. 2d 498, 525,624 N.W.2d 405 (2001) (rejecting the argument that 
"because the harm to the children if they were retained in Iran would be so 
devastating, the mere possibility of that occunence was sufficient to 
prevent Ardestani from taking the children to Iran, regardless of the 
likelihood of that occunence"). 8 Rather than focusing on the worst -case 
7 In fact, other state courts have allowed parents to take their children to countries that are 
not Hague signatories. See In the Matter ofRix, 161 N.H. 544, 548-49, 20 A.3d 326 
(20ll) (allowing father to take child to India, despite mother's claims that India is not a 
Hague signatory, because father has deep fmancial ties to the United States and has lived 
here for twenty years); Abouzahr v.lvlatera-Abouzahr, 361 N.J. Super. at 157 (allowing 
father to visit Lebanon with couple's child, even though Lebanon is not a Hague 
signatory); Long v. Ardestani, 241 Wis. 2d 498,527,624 N.W.2d 405 (2001) (allowing 
father to visit Iran with his four children); Jawad v. Whalen, 326lll. App.3d 141,759 
N.E. 2d 1002 (200 l) (allowing father to visit Iraq with his children); In reMarriage of 
Al-Zouhayli, 486 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing father to visit Saudi 
Arabia and Syria with his child). 
8 The Long court ultimately affinned an order allowing a father to take his children to 
Iran, even where the evidence established that Iran was not a signatory to the Hague 
Convention, it did not have diplomatic relations with the United States, and the courts of 
Iran would not recognize an order of a court ofthe United States- all of which were 
factors the court considered as part of its calculus. 241 Wis. 2d at 525. 
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scenario, the purportedly threatened parent should have to demonstrate by 
a preponderance of the evidence that there is a strong probability that an 
abduction would occur. See In reMarriage of Al-Zouhayli, 486 N.W.2d 
10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that "a strong probability of abduction 
must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence" because of "the 
importance of meaningful visitation, and because the allegation of 
endangerment was based solely on speculation as to what [the father] 
might do"); Susan L. Barone, International Parental Child Abduction: A 
Global Dilemma With Limited Relief- Can Something lv!ore Be Done?, 8 
N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 95, 118 (1995). Here, the trial court's focus on the 
worst-case scenario mistook a possibility for a probability. 
This Comi should direct lower comis to focus on a pmiicular 
cmmtry's legal procedures and the probability (rather than possibility) of 
abduction, rather than focus exclusively on whether a parent's ancestral 
country signed the Hague Convention. 
IV. The Best Interests of Mixed Race Children Include Exposing Them to 
Both Halves of Their Cultural Heritage. 
Neither the trial comi nor the appellate comi considered the 
importance of exposure to the father's culture when determining the 
children's best interests. 
The best interests of mixed-race children include leaming about 
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both parents' respective cultures. See Femando v. Nieswandt, 87 Wn. 
App. 103, 105-06, 940 P.2d 1380 (1997)(affirming trial comi's decision 
to award father visitation rights after expeti testified that "a mixed-race 
child ... needed to learn about her father's culture as well as her 
mother's"). While RCW 26.09.184 provides that courts "may" consider 
the cultural heritage of a child in fashioning a parenting plan, Amici asseti 
that it is fundamentally within a bi-racial child's best interests to be 
exposed to both pmis of his or her cultural heritage. Here, however, the 
lower cotuis' errors effectively deprive these children of half their heritage 
by denying them the right to travel to India to visit their family and 
experience their culture. 
As Amici point out in the Memorandum in Suppmi of the Petition 
for Review, meaningful contact with family and culture is an essential 
ingredient for Asians generally, and Indians particularly. Traveling to 
one's ancestral home helps mixed race children form personal bonds with 
their extended family and understand their etlmicity. Tllis personal 
connection is especially impmiant in cases like these where the mixed race 
children have to rely exclusively on one parent to cultivate their Indian 
heritage. There is no evidence that exposing these children to their Indian 
culture would harm them in any way. The lower courts erred by not 
considering the importance of this factor. 
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mixed race child's ability to learn about both sides of his cultme as an 
essential component Jn determining the best interests of that child." 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Comt should REVERSE the 
Court of Appeals and VACATE the tl'ial court's travel restrictions. · 
RESPECTFULLY SUB!vll'ITED this_ day of October 2011. 
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality ("Korematsu 
Center") is a non-profit organization based at Seattle University School of 
Law that works to advance justice through research, advocacy, and 
education. The Korematsu Center is dedicated to advancing the legacy of 
Fred Korematsu, who defied the militmy orders during World War II that 
ultimately led to the incarceration of II 0,000 Japanese Americans. He 
took his challenge to the United States Supreme Comi, which upheld his 
conviction in 1944 on the ground that the removal of Japanese Americans 
was justified by "military necessity." Fred Korematsu went on to 
successfully vacate his conviction and to champion the cause of civil 
libetiies and civil rights for all people. The Korematsu Center, inspired by 
his example, works to advance his legacy by promoting social justice for 
all. It has a special interest in promoting faimess in the comis of our 
country. That interest includes ensuring that presumptions based on 
national origin, ethnicity, and culture not be used to justify unfair 
restrictions on impmiant family relationships and activities incident to 
those family relationships. The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or 
otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle University. 
The Asian Bar Association of Washington ("ABA W") ts the 
professional association of Asian Pacific American attorneys, judges, law 
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professors, and law students that strives to be a network for its members in 
Washington State. Created in 1987, ABAW advocates for the legal needs 
and interests of the AP A community and represents over 200 AP A 
attorneys in a wide range of practice areas. It is a local affiliate of the 
National Asian Pacific American Bar Association (NAP ABA). Through 
its network of committees, ABA W monitors legislative developments and 
judicial appointments, rates judicial candidates, advocates for equal 
opportunity, and builds coalitions with other organizations within the legal 
profession and in the community at large. ABA W also addresses crises 
faced by its members and the broader Asian and Pacific Islander 
community in Washington. The founders created ABA W precisely to 
address issues like the ones presented in this appeal. Further, ABA W's 
interest in this specific matter dates back to 2005 when ABA W submitted 
Memorandum of Amici Asian Bar Association of Washington and 
Vietnamese American Bar Association of Washington in Supp01t of 
Appellant's Motion for Review in In re Maniage of Katare (Supreme 
Court No. 76691-6 (Comt of Appeals No. 52331-6-I)) ("Memorandum of 
Amici"). 
The Pacific Notihwest District of the Japanese American Citizens 
League (PNW-JACL) is a regional affiliate of the Japanese American 
Citizens League (JACL). The JACL, founded in 1929, is the nation's 
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oldest and largest Asian American non-profit, non-pmiisan organization 
cmmnitted to upholding the civil rights of Americans of Japanese ancestry 
and others. The JACL has over I 00 chapters with members in nearly every 
state and in Japan, and in the United Sates is divided into seven 
geographic districts. PNW -JACL includes Alaska, Oregon, the Idaho 
Panhandle and Washington State and represents nine chapters within the 
region. During World War II, people of Japanese ancestry were denied 
their constitutional rights by their forced relocation from the West Coast 
region and confinement in concentration camps by the United States based 
solely on their ethnicity and without individual review. Knowing the harm 
caused by discrimination and the importance of protecting our 
constitutional guarantees, PNW -JACL works actively to promote and 
preserve the heritage, history, and legacy of the Japanese American 
community. PNW-JACL has weighed in on issues regarding the 
application of a policy or law that may have a disparate impact on an 
individual, family, or community because of ethnicity or national origin. 
The Vietnamese American Bm· Association of Washington 
("V ABA W") is a professional association of attorneys, law professors, 
judges, and law students involved in issues impacting the Vietnamese 
American community in Washington State. Formed in 2005, its objectives 
are to provide mutual support for attorneys in the advancement of their 
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careers, to be a trusted guide and resource for students who aspire towards 
the legal profession, to serve as a voice for the local Vietnamese American 
community, and to represent Vietnamese American attorneys within the 
State Bar. V ABA W shares ABA W's interests and pmiicipates in similar 
activities with respect to V ABA W's pmiicular constituency. It, too, has a 
special interest in pursuing the goals of equal opportunity and access to 
justice. V ABA W has a strong interest in issues surrounding the treatment 
of immigrants in all areas of the legal system, including in fmnily law. 
Further, V ABA W' s interest in this specific matter dates back to 2005 
when V ABA W joined with ABA Win submitting Memorandum of Amici 
in this matter. 
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